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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
n i s 
i: u* i.ji guilty plea t second degree felony sexual 
* ' ir : • V: ir • \ )<ri^A District Court :r and for 
moti:^ * 
abuse 
Tooeie , . . . . . 
under Utah Code >V/ . ^  - ^ j - M 2 ) ie) (Supp. 1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with sexual abuse uf a 
child, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-404.1 (Supp. 1 9 8 5 ) . On January 3, 1986, defendant pled 
guilty as charged before the Honorable Johi :t t Rokich. In return 
for the plea, the prosecutor recommended probation, reduction to 
a third degree ft 1 i -ny after successful completion of probation 
and promised to £ i1e no other charges on defendant 1s conduct with 
t h e v i c t i m, A f t e r a 9 0 - d a y e v a 1 u a t i o n , t h e C o u r t s e n t e n c e d 
d e £ e n c:i a i \ * * ! a e t e r m i n a t e t <i r m o 1: o i e t o £ i f t e e i i y e a i: s a t 11 i e 
Utah State i i I L ^ ^ . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 3, 1986 defendant freely and voluntarily 
pled guilty to the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child, a felony of 
the second degree (Tr. 6-9). Prior to entering the plea, the 
parties disclosed their plea negotiations to the court (Tr. 3, 5-
6). In turn, the court advised defendant that the court had made 
no agreement as to the sentence to be imposed (Tr. 8), and that 
the court was not bound by anyonefs recommendations (Tr. 9). 
Defendant acknowledged that he understood both indications (Tr. 
8,9) . 
On March 10, 1986 the court ordered that defendant 
submit to a 90-day evaluation at the Utah State Prison, following 
the recommendations ot the presentence report (Tr. 1). At this 
time, defense counsel petitioned the court for a continuance in 
order to submit a motion to withdraw defendant's guilty plea (Tr. 
13-17). Defense counsel argued extensively that in light of a 
then recent Utah case State v. Kav, 717 P.2d, 1294 (Utah 1986) 
defendant may be allowed to withdraw his plea (Tr. 13-17). 
On March 17, 1986 the court denied defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea after extensive argument by defense 
counsel that the Kay case allows defendant to do so (Tr. 3). The 
court ordered defendant to undergo a 90-day evaluation. 
On June 11, 1986 the court sentenced defendant to the 
Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of one to fifteen 
years, atter the prosecution and defense counsel recommended 
probation (Tr. 58). During this proceeding, defendant renewed 
his motion to withdraw his plea and the court denied it. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defenda't'^ •.. * < *•
 : ;* - * -•• >t conditioned upon the 
trial coin t impo - trie sentence recommended by the prosecutor. 
0n the contrary
 r -
 fn'ai "inflop i r o i t the : \ ::its€ • t 
: bound \3 tr* recommendat. ^ - defendant entered his 
1
 ' ' r sentence '• 
provided K - .*-:.-' ; -• • - • t:.~, * -i sid not vt i in 
retusin^ to a^o* ctiu..:-... L * thdraw his plea, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS SOUND 
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S M mT^N TO 
WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA 
Defendant claims that the court's denial ~f his motion 
tO Wit' T- - * ed Wdb a b U b S t a n t i a x viola t ::.)*~ 
rights t.- \ . *• . r . thir appeal. This claim * t 
of well-established t't.* J* ; ' : defendant .is n : entire:, jf 
a matt* : 
In State v. Hanson. 627 P.2d 53, S4 (Utah l^BM, the 
Utah Supreme Court indicated: 
It is well settled in Utah law that a motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea prior to judgment 
is subject to the discretion of the court: 
such withdrawal is not a matter of right* 
See also State v. Mildenhall, Case No. 860366, sliy op. at (Utah 
£1 ! ed Nov. 19, 1987). Moreover, under Utah law a defendant may 
not challenge the discretion of tin* i oin t solely UII the ha 
detenaant's belief that the couit would adopt the plea agreement. 
In iLlIUL&l r * f *" ''''"ft I intc.l out : 
[Defendant's mere belief that the judge 
would impose a lenient sentence, particularly 
where the judge explicitly retused at the 
time of the plea to be bound by any 
recommendation to do so is insufficient to 
render denial of his motion an abuse of 
discretion. 
Id at 55. The instant case is indistinguishable from Hanson and 
therefore, defendant's claim that his rights were violated fails. 
Defendant's arguments to the contrary are based on a 
misreading of State v. Kay, 717 P.d 194 (Utah 1986). In that 
case the trial court actively participated in the plea bargain 
process and came to a conditional agreement with the defendant. 
The court promised to sentence Kay to no more than life 
imprisonment if he pled guilty to first degree murder charges, 
boon after accepting the agreement the court decided not to 
follow it. The court then gave defendant the option to go 
forward with the guilty plea or to withdraw the guilty plea and 
go to trial. The defendant in Kay sought specific performance of 
the plea bargain agreementf and the issue on appeal was whether 
the court may withdraw from a conditional plea bargain agreement 
once the court accepts the agreement's conditions. 
Kay is inapplicable to the instant case. First, the 
issue in this case is whether the court abused its discretion by 
refusing defendant's attempt to withdraw his plea. In Kay# that 
was never an issue given that the court did offer that option to 
the defendant. Moreover, while in Kay the trial judge actively 
participated in the plea bargaining process even to the exclusion 
of the prosecutor, in the instant case, the court expressly 
retused to be bound by the agreement between the defendant and 
the prosecutor. 
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Defendant's reterences to Kay are highly misleading 
because they are either taken out of contextf or plainly wrong. 
First, Justice Durham did not write a concurring opinion in Kay 
as defendant indicates. Defendant's quotations to that effect 
are taken from footnote (3) to Justice Zimmerman's majority 
opinion. Second, the citation of United States v. Blackwell, 694 
F.2d 1325, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1982) contained in that footnote 
points out what the federal law in the area is, based on federal 
rules, as opposed to Utah rules. That this reference was never 
intended to interpret Utah law becomes obvious when placed in 
context as follows: 
This provision in the Utah rules differs from 
Rule 11 of the Federal Ruels of Criminal 
Procedure in that the Utah rule suggests that 
the trial court can withdraw from the plea 
agreement even after a guilty plea has been 
formally accepted and entered on the record. 
The federal rule, on the other hand, permits 
a court to accept or reject a plea that is 
conditioned upon an agreement as to a 
particular sentence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 
11(e)(3). If the court rejects the 
agreement, it must allow the defendant to 
withdraw the plea; if it accepts the 
agreement, it is generally bound to adhere to 
the terms ot the agreement. United States v. 
Blackwell, 694 F.d 135, 1339 (D.C, Cir. 198), 
The federal rule does not allow a judge carte 
blanche authority to renege on a plea 
agreement after the agreement has been 
accepted. 2J£. This power, apparently 
granted by the Utah rule, to withdraw from a 
plea agreement at any time should not be 
taken literally. In appropriate 
circumstances, due process and double 
jeopardy considerations will prohibit the 
judge from reneging on the agreement. See 
discussion in part III infra. 
State v. Kav at 1299 n. 3. The language of this footnote 
indicates that conditional pleas when accepted by the trial court 
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may be binding on the court in appropriate circumstances. 
Howeverf in this case, defendant did not enter nor did the trial 
court accept a conditional plea* Here the trial court told 
defendant at the outset that it was not accepting a conditional 
plea and would not be bound by the recommendation of the 
prosecutor regarding defendant's sentence. 
The "second step" under Rule 11 which defendant alleges 
Kay clarifies applies only where, as in Kav# the court exercises 
its option to accept a conditional plea and to disclose the 
court's decision to the parties prior to the entering of the 
guilty plea. Kay does not stand for the proposition that the 
court must disclose to the defendant whether it will approve the 
proposed disposition. Such a reading ignores the clear statutory 
language that the court may indicate whether the agreement will 
be approved by the court. 
Thus, it was within the court's discretion to allow 
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. The court was not 
obligated to disclose to defendant whether the court would 
approve or disapprove the plea bargain agreement between 
detendant and the prosecution. Therefore, the court's decision 
to deny defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea did not 
constitute error* 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A CERTIFICATE OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE 
Defendant urges this Court to issue a certificate of 
probable cause so that he may seek release pending the outcome of 
this appeal.* Notwithstanding defendant's argument to the 
contrary, he has not established that the issue raised in this 
appeal is substantial and requires the Court to issue the 
certiticate. Given that defendant's argument fails entirely to 
establish any error in the trial court, the issue is necessarily 
insubstantial. Defendant's request for a certificate of probable 
cause should, therefore, be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to attirm defendant's conviction and deny his request for a 
certificate ot probable cause. 
DATED this ^M day of /06C6on6&2> , 1987. 
DAVID L, WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
^Prdfol£'*77Q**W 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
' Assistant Attorney General 
* While detendant also urges this Court to grant his release, 
this Court is without authority to grant this request even if 
defendant prevails in his quest for a certificate of probable 
cause. Releasse is an issue for the trial court. State v. 
Neeley, 707 P.2d 647 (Utah 1985). 
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